Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1966

Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Company, a
Corporation v. Leon G. Pritchett, Administrator of
the Estate of Mary Il Pritchett, Deceased :
Petitioner's Brief On Rehearing

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Mitsunaga & Ross; Attorney for Appellant-Petitioner
Recommended Citation
Petition for Rehearing, Equitable Life v. Pritchett, No. 10558 (1966).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3809

This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In the Supreme Court of the Stale of Utah
Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance
Company, a corporation
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner

Case No.
t.+8760.:

- vs Leon G. Pritchett, Administrator

/(' S-5-?

of the Estate of Mary IL Pritchett,
Derral'wd.

Plaintiff-Respondent.

PETI'I1IONER'S BRIEF ON RE-HEARING
Petition for Re-hearing from the Judgment of the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah
:MITSDNAGA & ROSS
731 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for AppellantPetitioner

John L. Black
530 .T udge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
.ittorney for Respondent

~ '"'"

C

·-;:,II

'.1

[1:

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ST ATEl\IENT OF KIND OF CASE ___________________ _
nrsPOS1TION

Page

ON APPEAL

1
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON RE-HEARING

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

PETITION FOR REHEARING

--------·----------- -------------------·-·-·--· 4

ARGUMENT

5

Point I
Failure to disclose deceased's previous disease, prevents
recovery under the insurance contract regardless of
whether it was the cause of death if failure to disclose

5

was intentional.

Point II
Although the insurer's agent had knowledge of the in;<ured's applicant fraud, this knowledge irnay not be
imputed to the insurer to allow recovery under the contract 14
CONCLUSION _________________________________ --------------------------------------------- 13
CASES CITED

Benson v. Banker's Life and Cas. Co., 362 P2d 1039 (Colo.) .... 7-12
C'.1iifon1ia-Western States Life Insurance Co. v. Feinstein,
'I (' 2cl 103, 101 P.2d 835 __ .

8

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Po(/(

Central West Casualty Co. v. Steward, 48 Ky. 137, 58 S.W.
2d 336 -··---··---·--------------------------------·------------------·---·-------·-------·-- 14
Chadwick v. Beneficial Life Insurance Co., 54 Utah 443, 181
Pac. 448 -·······---------------·--·-····---·---··--·--------------------·········---·--·---.s
East New York Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230_____________

__ 11 •

Farrington v. Granite States Fire Ins. Co., 120 Utah 109,
237 P.2d 754 -------------··-·-----------------·-·-··----·---·-·-··--·-··-----·-·----Fidelity Casualty Co. of New York v. Middlemiss, 103 Utah
429, 135 P.2d 275 ........ ---------····-··----·---···-··--------··-----·--·--·-----__ 7-12
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398____________ _ 11
Klein v. Farmer's and Banker's Life Insurance Co., 132 Kan.
748, 297 Pac. 730 ________ -------· ____________ -------· -··-·-----·- _____________ 8-12
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Grow, 103 Utah 285, 135 P.2d 120 ____ 8
North American Life Insurance Company of Chicago v. Korrey, 149 P.2d 1157 .. -----· ___ _

8

Owen v. United States Surety Co., 38 Okla. 123, 131 Pac. 10918-1~
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Zak, 185 Okla. 556, 94 P .2d 889 ________ 7-8 12
Reserve Life Insurance Company v. Isom, 70 Okla. 277, 173
Pac. 841 ·--·---- ··---------------···------·------·-----·--·----··------·-------Russell v. New York Life Ins. Co., 35 Ida. 774, 209 Pac 27.'l

8-12

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Salene v. Queen City Ins. Co., 59 Or. 297, 116 Pac. 1114 ____________ 14
Telford v. New York Life Insurance Co., 9 C.2d 103, 69 P.2d
835 --- -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------

8

Torbensen v. Family Life Insurance Co., 163 C.A. 2d 401, 329
p .2d 596 -- ---------------------------------------------- -- ------------ --- ----- -------------- 7-12
Zolintakis v. Equity Life Assurance Society, 97 F.2d 583 (10th
Cir.) --------------------- ___________________________________________________________________ 7-8
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-8 (both prior and after the 1963
amendment) ----------------------------------------- _________________ 4-6-7-10-11-13
Restatement of Contracts --------------------------------------------------------------

9

Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57 Harv.
L. Rev. 852 ____ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11
Am. Jur. 2d Agency, section 83 ____________________________________________________ 14

In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
E11nitable Life & Casualty Insurance
C'olll]Hlll~',

a eoqwration

Def end a 11 t-AppPll m1 t-Pd it ion er
Case No.

- vs -

1487G5

Leon 0. J>ritclwtt, Administrator

of thP Estate> of Man, ll. Pritchett,
DPcPasPd.
Pla i 11 t if [-Respondent.

PT~TI'l IONER 'S
1

BRIEF ON

RE-HJ~ARINO

This is an action to <>nforcP an insurance policy
i\]1ich 1rns issued pnrsuant to an application on which
111isn•pres(•ntatiom; wt>re made.

DISPOSITION OX APPJ<~AL

ct111l

Plamtiff was awarded $3,:'>13.00 in the lower comt
this Y<>rdiet 11·as snstained on appeal.

2

RELJEF SOFGHT

O~ RB~-1IEARTNG

Reversal of trial court's d(•cision and Snpn'rnP
eourt's d0cision.

STATEl\fENT OF FACTS
The dec0ased applied for hospital msurance from
P0titionN insurance company.
On the application, deceas0d intentionally omittt>\l
some of her past medical history and misreprPsenb·d
tlH~

stat0 of hrr ]walth.
The Petitioner, relying· on the misrepresented go<Hl

stat<' of health, issued deceased full insuranc0 covrrage.
Had the Petitioner known tlw riast conditions anil
present state of dec(•asPd 's lwalth, Petitioner would not
have issued the sa11w policy, hut would Jiaye changed tlw
terms -

prohahly hy issuing a rider ex<>mpting cPrtain

illnesses.
Both the deceased and heneficiar~T' Plaintiff, hail
knowledge o.f tl1P misrepn'sentations and int<>nded to d1•
fraud tlw Defendant-Petitioner. The Petitioner's ag-e11r
also had knmdedge of tht> misrepreS('ntations.

3
11 he deceased later died from an affhction which the

trial court found not to he connected with any of the
illnesses she failed to disclos('.
Petitioner, learning of the fraud, refused to pay
oYer

to the lwneficiary from the policy.
The beneficiary instituted suit to recover.

1-'he trial court allowed recovNy. It found that
although Plaintiff and deceased had defrauded the company, the Petitioner could not prevent r('covery because
it had "unclean hands" since its application form was too
hrid. Furthermore, the trial court found that the Plain1iff 's and deceased's fraud ·would not deny Plaintiff

n·f·owry since deceased did not diP from an affliction sh<>
failed to

disclosf~;

therrfon th0 fraud was not matPrial.
1

,

On ap1wal, the "Gtah Supreme Court sustained the
judgnwnt of the trial court. The Supreme Court held that
the fraud was not material inasmuch as the deceased did
not die from an affliction which she failed to disclose.
Tlte Supreme Court also indicated that it was relevant
that the Prtitioner's agent had knowledge of the fraud.
On Rl'l1earino· the Defendant takes issue with both
l':l'
1
·1' tlt(':--c· Conclusions of Law.

4
PETITT OX FOT~ HE l !EAR JXG
Petition<>r eont<>nds that tlw lTtah f-\upn'HH' Com(
<'lTed in the ahov0 entith'd rase in allowing n'C'OV('ry 011
an insuranct> contraet. 11 lw Court allmn•d a n·eoYPJ'Y
PVen though the rt> \\'Pre m isrep<'s<>nta ti on s in th<> im:manc<' application on the ground that tlw misn•pn•spntatiom; wen• not material to the acce>ptance of the risk or
the hazard assumed hy tlw insnr<'r. Petition<>r conte1Hl>
that whf•n a misrepresc>ntation on an insurance applieation was intentional, willful, and mad<> in had faith.
l'Pcovery should not hl' 1wrmitted. lf such a misrt>pn'sentation is fraudulent, the fact that the misre11rPsPntation is not material to tlw ac.('PptaneP of th<> risk or
l1azard assunwd is irrPlevant.
Tlw rtah 8uprPHH' Court, in its pr<>vions opinion,
rPlit•d on Utah Code A1111. ~ 31-19-8 (prior to 1063 amendment). l\•titioner contPnds that this \ms <>ITor inasmu!'li
as the effoctive dat<• of th<> 1 ~Hi:i am<>nd111ent was pnnr
to th<> time> tlH' eamw of action arosP.
In its previous opinion, it ap1wars that the l'tali
Supreme Court may have h<>en infhwne<>d hy th<' fact
that tlw petitioner's ag<>nt had knO\dPdµ:e of tlw frand
eonunittPd b_.,- thP insun•d, applicant. J'Ptit innl'l' C'ontP1HI~
that thiR "·as prror inasmueh as tlw aw·nt, who parti('i
patNl in the applicant's fraud, ·was ad inµ; ontsiclP of tili'
scopP of lwr ag<•ncy n•lationship and adn•rs1•l:> to tli
1

petition<'r.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
FAIL URE TO DISCLOSE DECEASE D'S PREVIOUS
DISEASE PREVENTS RECOVERY UNDER THE
IN SUR AN C E

CONTRACT

REGARDLESS

OF

WHETHER IT WAS THE CAUSE OF DEATH, IF
THE FAILURE TO DISCLOSE WAS INTENTIONAL.

'l1he gist of Petitioner's argument on re-hearing is
simply that if the misreprrsntations or concralments on
an insnrance application Wf're intentional and willful,
n•co.very on the insurancP policy should not be allowed.
The materiality of the conr(•aled disease or affliction to
1lit> risk or hazard assumed is irrelevant if the misrepre~Pntations or concPalmPnts arP willful and fraudulPnt,
~:!though matPriality is rPlPvant if thP misreprpsntation
11 as not intc>ntional and made in good faith.
endonhtedly, there is some conflict over what mislPpresentations and omissions on an insurance application will avoid the insurPr's liability. 'I1he Ftah Court has
i·onsid(•r0d this to be one of tlw most important questions
rdating to th(~ law of insuranc<>. Clwdwirk v. Beneficial
TAI' lJ1s11ra11cr Company, 5-l- Utah -t.-l-3, 181 Pac. 448, 450
(]~Jl!J). llistorically, r0presPntations on an insuranC('
;:11pli1·ation W<-'n' conside>n-'d to he warrantiPs, and any
1 1i~ ~tat<•nwnt was consiclerPd to lie a hr<>ach of warranty

6
justifying n•seission of tlw insurancP eontraet. s('(' H11ssdl r. New York Life l11s11rnnn· Co., <':l lda. /'i-1-, ~O!l p,ll'.
273, 27-1- ( 19~2). In orclPr to avoid th0 harsh ml<> gow 111 _
ing warrantiiPs, most states ha V<' Pnaeted statntPs prn
viding that in tlw ahs<>ne<-> of fraud state111Pnts in
insurance applications will he treated as repr<>s<•ntatim1,
rather than ·warranties. Ibid; Se<' Ctah Code Ann. Z:ll19-8 (2) (Prior to 19G3 amencl11wnt). Fncler sueh statutP~,
a mis-statement, on an insurancP applieation will not
avoid a policy unlPss tlw rnisn'presentation is fraudulent
or material to thP acceptancP of tlH' risk or the hazunl
assunwd hy thP irn;;urer. J1Jid.
In the instant case, tlw rtah Court d0cid<'d that
although tlwn• had hePn a rnisn-'JH'<'SPntation on tl1<> insurance application, tlH• insnrecl 's lwm•ficiary could still
rPcover inasmuch as ''tlu• eonC'ealments eomplairn·d of
were no·t material to tlw risk assu11wd h~' the AppPllant."
Petitiont>r eontends that th<' eonrt <>rrPd this holdin.l!.
Petitioner would agr<'e that tlw ahovP holding wonld liaw
heen corrPet had th<> eonc<>alnwnts or misr<'Jll'<'Sntation
not been intPntional and willful. H owt>v<>r, tlw trial eon rt
found ''that at the time and plaee [th<> applieant, insurt>rll
was aware of the fact that she had failed to make a full
disclosun• of all medical history . . . in tlw application
submitt(~d

to the company ... and left the pol:cy appli('u-

tion in the form submith_•d in the hopE• of reet>iving eor<•ra<rp
that slw would not havP lwt>n p;rankd had ... a
l"'l
full nwdieal history h<•Pn covert>d. '' Tlw p;<•nt>ral rul<'

Jc

7
tliat wlwn a misrepresentation on an insurance application is made intf'ntionally, willfull~,r, and in bad faith, the
policy may he rescinded or avoided regardless of whether
tliP misrepresentation or concealment of the past disease
11·as material to the disease Pventually causing death. See
Torlm1scn v. Family Life Insurancr Co., 163 C.A. 2d 401,
:~29 P. 2cl, 59G; Benson v. Bankers Life and Gas. Co., 362
I'. 2cl 1039 (Colo.); Prudential Insurance Co. r. Zak, 185
Okla. 55G, 94 P. 2d. 889.
There is Utah authority to support the general rule
~tated above. The Utah Statute prior to the 1963 amend111(·11t, 31-19-8 Utah Code Ann. (1953), provided that ''in
any applieation for life or disability insurance made in
\\'l'iting h.v the insured all statenwnts therein made by
tlw immred shall, in the alJsrnce of frmffl, be dPemed
J'(•presrntations and not warranties." (emphasis added).
Tlnrn if fraud was committed h.v the insured applicant,
his statenwnts on the application will he det>med to bf'
\\'arrantiPs and then the strict rule governing warrantiPs
11 ill apply. That rule, as stated above, is that any variation from the truth rt>sults in a technical breach o.f thP
contract giving the insurPr the right to rescind. Ftah
( 'm;p Law also supports such a proposition. In Fidelity

,\ Cas1111lty Co. of N ru.· York
~l!J,

11 •

Middlemiss, 10:3 Ftah

1;)3 P. 2d 275, 279 ( 1942), the court quoting from

/,n[i11takis

n. Equity Life Assurance Society, 97 F. 2d

:-i'-3, ;l~() (10th Cir.) stated "A misrP]Jresentation will not
;·,1n~titutP

a ddense to an action on a policy of insurancP

8
unless it was intentionally untrue or was made with r{'{'klPss disr0gard for its truth of falsity. Tlw court gors 011
to state that where the misrepr0sentation is material, it
is not necessay to prove an actnal or conscious purposti to
deceivP. SPe also, Telford v. !-.Tew York Life lnsura11ce
Co., 9 C. 2d 103, G9 P.2d. 835; Californin-lVcstern Stntrs
Life lns11rance Co. 1'. Fci'nstcin, 9 C. 2d 103, 101 P. 2d 8:):J:
North Am. Life Ins. Co. of Chica.r10 v. Korrey, 1-1-9 P.2d ,
1157. Thus it can hP said that thPr0 is a distinction hPhY00n a fraudulent rnisn•prPsPntation and one whirh i~
not fraudulent. If the mis-stat(•rnent is not frauduh•nt,
then it is treated as a misrepresentation and the insurPr
may not avoid tlw policy unless it is mat0rial to thP acrtiptance of the risk or tlw hazard assunwd hy thP insmrr.
Telford 1'. Neu- rork Life /11s11rnnce Company, Sllf!l"n.
Californin-lV cstern States Liff' /11s11ra11ce Compo11y r.
Feinstein, supra., North A111. Lif<' /11sura11ce Com}J({'ill/
of Chicago 1·. K orrey. s11prn. Tf thP misrepr<>s<>ntation
was madt- fraudulentl~T' with tlH' int<>nt to induc<> tlw insuraneP company to. provide covPrag<•, thPn it is no long-n
1wcPssary to show that tlw misn']lr<'s<'tation was material
to tlw risk or hazard assmned. Prndential /11s11rm1cc Co.
r. Zak, 185 Okla. 556, 9-1- P. :2d 889; Reserre Loan Lifl'
J11s11rance Company v. Isom, /()Okla. 211, 113, Par. S-1-1:
Klein r. Farmer's a11d Ranker's J,if1' !11s11rr111cr Co., U!
Kan. 7-!S, 2U7 Pac. 730; Ou·en 1'. l 'nitcd Stutes Surel,11

Co., 38 Okla. 123, 131 Pac. 1091.
In tlw two eases whid1 tht> ~llJffPllH' Court <'it<>d in
its prior opinion in the instant casP, F({rri11.r1ton c. (hr1 11

9

States Fire Insurance Co., 120 Utah 109, 237 P. 2d.
13-±; New Yark Life Insurance Co. v. Grow, 103 f'."tah 285,
13j P. 2d 120 (See footnote 1) the court found that there
\1cn~ no intentional, fraudulc~nt, or misrepresentatio·ns
\rhich were knowingly made. Thus, the courts in the Farri11qton and Grow cases held that the insurer was liable
lwcause the misrepresentations, which were innocently
made, ·were not material to the risk or hazard assumed by
tlir ins1uer. rrheref ore, these cases were not in point with
llw instant case in which therr was an intentional and
\\'illful misrepresentation.
ilr

General contract rules also. support the position that
an int<>ntional fraud will give grounds for avoiding a
contract whilf' a non-intentional repn•sentation must be
lllatn·ial to the contract in order to avoid it. Restate-

111ent of Contracts, Sec. 47G provides that a transaction
1:-;

rnidahle where there is a fraud or a material mirepre-

1--Pntation. In the comnwnt to section 47G, sub section (b),
11

i:-; provid<•d that "the difference in the effect of an

nnocPnt and that of fraudulent misrepresentations ...

1

i:- hrn fold. In the first plac<>, materiality of the mistake
inducpd h~, the innocent misrepn•sentation is essential
1\l1i]p materiality is not essential if a mistake induced
IJ\· fraud procures the intend<'<l consequencf'S." The Re-

xlrtfe111ent of Contracts, Sec. -±71 distinguishes between
1'n111<1
11

and misn•presentation by defining fraud as a mis-

p1·u:-;pntation knmYn to be such.

10

Support fo.r the view that an int<>ntional misrrprcsPntation will avoid tlH' insure>r's liability nnd(•r an insm.
ance contract is found in the 1963 anwndnwnt to 31-19-'1.,
Utalz Code Ann. (Rc,pl. vol. 19Gil). 'l1liat sPction provid<'~:
''l\1isrepresentations, omissions, concPalnH,'nt of facts, and
incorre>ct statPnwnts shall not pre>vPnt a n•cov<>ry urnln
tl1e policy unh•ss:
(a) Fraudulent, or
(b) 1Iat0rial ... "
'l'he lih,ral intN]H'Ptatio·n of this seetion would U('<·onl
with th1• general ruh• as stated ahovP. RerovNy is prevPntPd if the misn•presrntations, omissions or cnn<'<·nl
ment of facts are fraudnlPnt. But, if the>· an• innorPntl.1
rnadP, th<• insnrrr will not <•sca1w liability nnlPss tlw1
werP matc>rial to thP arr<>ptanr(' to thP risk or hazard
assurnNl h>· thP insun•r.
Dt•fendant ,,·ould ront<•nd that the 1!)(ii) airn•ndm<'111
to srction 31-19-8 should appl>· to tlH• prPsent ras<~ ina~
much as thP insnrPd 's (h•ath oc<·nrn•d after the pffrdiw
dak o.f the amernlmPnt. In tlH' 1irevious opinion in tl\I'
instant cas0, the court rpfa•d on that statnt(•s prior to tl1··
19G3 amendment. It seems that then• is onl:--· one possihl··
theory upon which the court could havP lwld that th•·
prior statute appli0d: that is tht> old ml<' that wli1•n :i
eontract is entered into it inrorporat('s thP law of th·
:o-.tate then in effect and that no suhs<~qm•nt ('hang.- in ii

1

11
bw may affrct the contract, or it will he a violation of
tlw contrad clause of the fedPral constitution. Petitioner
1·ontPnds that the 19G3 amendment did not change the
luw with respect to an intentional misrepresentation
;m1iding the insurance policy. HowevPr, assuming that
tlw JlP\\- law did change the old statute, Petitioner would
contend that the new law governs, inasmuch as it was
<'f'frrtive at the date of death, and that the contract chose
of the fodf'ral constitution would not he violatPd hy
applying the new statute. S(•P, East N <'U' York Savings
J;r1J1k v. lfahn, 32G U.S. 230 (1945); Hom<' Bldg & Lonn
Jss'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Hale, The Su11re111r Court and the CO'ntract Clause, 57 Harv. l_,. RPv.
1.,;J~.

However, under eitlwr the old law or the 19G3 amend1111•nt to section 31-19-8, tlw insurer is allowPd to rescind
or avoid the contract on tlw grounds of fraud. Tlw
iinustion, then, is whether thP insured committed fraud
11n the insurance application.
The trial court found, in
it:s Fact Ko. 4, that tlu• insur0cl knowingly failed to make
il full disclosurP of the mPdial history. Rhe did so in
tl1e ho1Je of receiving covt'rage that \Yould not have heen
.!!:l'ant<'cl otherwise. 'The nPxt qtwstion is whPther, within
111" lll<'aning of sPction 31-Fl-8, an intPntional misrepn•~1·11tation

eonstitutc>s fraud or whethPr thP other elPments

i 11r a tort action in fraud must also he estahlishPd. Peti1i11J111r

would contend that thP JllPre intc>ntional and willful

:i, statP11wnt eonstitutes fraud ,,·ithin thP mPaning of

12
the insurance statut0s. See Rescri:c J,oa 11 Life Ins. Cn.
1·. Isom, 173 Pac. 8-11, Okl. 277; Prudential Insurnncr: Co.
t'. Zak, 185 Okla. 556, 9-! P. 2. 889; Klein v. Farmer's m1r1
Banker's Life Ins. Co., 132 Kan. 7-!-8, 297 Pac. 730; On111
·c. United States Surety Co., 38 Okla. 123, 131 Pac. 1091.
This would also accord with the Restatement of Contracts definition of fraud which was quokd pr0vionsly,
'•Fraud is a misrepresentation known to he such." Hmr
ever, assuming that the court requirf's th0 otlwr !'lPrnent'
of a tort action of fraud to lw t>stahlislH·d, Pf'titionC'r contends that they are lH'PS<'nt in t]w instant CaS<'. rndoubtedly, thP Findings of Fact slmw an intent to dPceiw
tlie insurancP company. Finding of Fact .No. -1: provid!·s
that tlw insured applicant •'l(•ft the policy application in
the fo11n submitted in tlw ho1w of r<'eeiving eovPragP tliat
she' would not have heen grantt>d had ... a full llH'lfanl
history be covert>d." This rnisn•prPsentation would lw
material '''ithin the mPaning of frand. ·with res1w<'l tn
rnakrialitv in conneetion with frnml th(• conceal<'d di'
.
'
N1se does not hav0 to rPlak to tlw causl' of dt'ath, TorlJl'Ji
sen i· Family Life l11s11ru11ce C'o111pa11y, 1()3 C. 2d -1-01,
329 P. 2d 59(); Benson r. Ba11kers J,ifc and Cas. Co ..
362 P. 2d 1039 (Colo.) sirnpl~,. that had the> conceall'd
affliction bcC'n known by tltP immrer, lw woul<l haw
ehangPd the amount of premium or PXePptt•d som<' ri,k
or part thereof from COV('l':.lg'l'. Fidl'lity crml Cwmalty C11
of New York v. llliddlemis.">, 103 rtah .J.29, 135 P. ~cl :!i:i.
'l1he trial court found that the imrnrer \nmld lia\'I'
attached a rider, cxeluding the diseasl' whieh \ms ('(IJI
1
eealcd by the insurPd, and tlrns the rnisrq>n•sp11tatiu11 1'

13
111t('1itional eoncPah1wnt was rnat('J'ial arnl indue('d th0
i11~nn·r to proviclc< full imrnranet> c·ovPrag<'. Thus, th0
r·kments for a fraud action have lwen rnadt> out: tlH'rP
\1 n,.: a !llisn'pn•sentation, ·which was mat<'rial, whieh was
111t('ntional, \Yhich was made to induce' the insurer to proride full coverage, and th0 insur0r r<>liPd upon tlw rnis11·1iresPntati o.n.
COXCLFSTO~

lTnder either the old law or the 19G3 arn0ndrn0nt to
c<>dion 31-19-8, the insured's henefieiary should not he'
p1·nnitted to recover under the insurance policy on tlw
L;To1mds of the insured's had faith and fraud. Prior to
l]1P 100:3 anwndnwnt, 31-19-8 (1) providPd that misreprP'(·ntations made in insurance applications \\·ill not lw
il1·r'JlH'cl material to defeat or avoid thf' rontract unlPss it
1' made with the intention to deePiv<>. Tn suhsection (2)
1]11' old statute provides that if the misrPpresentation is
I rnnrhil<>nt, it \\rill not he deemed a represmtation hnt will
11 1' consicl('red a warrant~·. Tlw eommon law would then
1
11 at thr> fraudulent statrnwnt as a warranty and any
1 1
1'Yiation from the truth would n'sult in a breach of
\rananty which wonld nullify tlw insurance contract. If
thr· eourt should rely on S('etion 31-19-8 after the 1903
:::11 1,mlu1t'nt, tlwn it should prevent rerovery unclt>r the
·n,t1rn11(·p eontract simpl~- on grounds of fraudulent mis·. 1 rr·:-;entation without going through the forrnalit>· of
:, "LIJ inµ; tht> n•pn•S('ntation as a warrant:--·. Thus, uncll'T'
r: · 1 st atntl>, fraud \Yonld pn'YPnt a rPeoy0ry.
1
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POINT II
ALTHOUGH THE INSURER'S AGENT HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THE INSURED'S APPLICANT'S FRAUD,
THIS KNOWLEDGE MAY NOT BE IMPUTED TO
THE INSURER TO ALLOW RECOVERY UNDER
THE CONTRACT.

ThP Ru1w11w Court in its prior opinion in tlH' in:-:tant
rasp did not hold that tlH' insnrN ·was liable hPran:-:<> it'.,
ag-Pnt had knowl<>clg<' of tlw insnn d applicant's fraud.
l-J owever, in tltt: ninth paragraph of the court's opinion,
it appears that the fart that tlH• insnn r 's ag('nt lw1l
knowlPdg<' may liav<> inflnene0d tlH ronrt 's opinion.
1

1

1

That paragTa.ph provi<lr•s:
'"There was trstimonv in th<> rPronl indicating- that
a full disrlosnn• of .th<> clPeedent's prior 11mlical
history was mad<> to X 01 RailP>·, thP appPllnnt'~
ag<>nt, and that thP ag<>nt n:-:0cl h<>r o\\·n diser<•ti1111
as to information to he inelnd<><l in th<> applii'a
tions."
1'he g<.•neral rul<' is that wh< n an agPnt attP111pt;-; t11
clPfrancl tlw principal, it is acting outside tlw seo]H' n:
tlw ageney r0lationship and tlw prinripal will not 11"
hound, nor will the agPnt's knowl<>dgr lw inqrnt<·d to 11
See 8nle11e r. Q11ec11 City Ins. Co., 59 Or. :.?!)'i, 1Ul Pal'.
111-1-: Ce11trnl lVest Cas11nlt11 Co. I'. St!'lrnrrl. -+~Ky. 1:l~.
.
i
•) j
. .1 I
~>8 R.\\T. :.?d 3:rn. Tlw rnle, as stah'< l rn ..:-i.111. ,, • 111. -''
1

A!}e11cy st>ehon ,..,.i, is:
•

00

.
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"WlH'never it appears that the interest of an agent
and those of its prinf'ipals are n0cessarily in
opposition in a particnlar transaction, strangers
dealing with the agent are charged with notice
of want of authority to hind the principal by his
ads. In perverting his own pow0rs to his own
personal ends and purposes, an ag·ent acts in
E~xcess of his authority, and persons who knowingly participate in such acts of perversion, ...
are not protected hy the authority conferrrd upon
the agent."
This rnle seems to apply to the precise facts in the
instant casr. It is ch~ar from the Findings of Fact that
t!te insured 's agent, N el Bailey, did know of the insured\;
n1Jpli<'ant's fraud, and that she, perhaps, encouraged it.
lfo\n'YPr, this was for tlw purpose of obtaining a comJlli:-::-:ion from the sa]p of the insurance policy to the
applieant and thus, she, in effect, acting for her own
lH'DPfit, ddraudc>d the insurance company. rndPr the
l.'.('JH>rnl rnlE•, the insurance eompany would not hav(~
!;nuwl<'(1g<' imputed to it, and thP insured, who partiripatP(} in the fraud, would not he protected.

::\ff'rSrXAGA & ROSS

731 East South Tt>mplP
Salt Lah Cit~', rtah
A tf m'n e,11 for A p7Jell r111 t Pf'titionrr

